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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A complex problem arises where a person in a telephone conver-
sation recognizes the voice of the antiphonal speaker and turns the
telephone over to the witness who does not identify the speaker. It
has been held that the witness may testify to the subsequent con-
versation, as it is hardly probable that another succeeded the speaker
-at the other end of the line.2 2 Identification was sufficiently estab-
lished in a case in which the defendant, conversing with a third
party, asked to speak to the witness and later admitted to the third
party that he had done so.
23
A different case arises where a bystander attempts to give testi-
inony tending to show the identity of the speaker at the other end
of the line. In the absence of personal knowledge as to the identity
such evidence may be hearsay.2 4 But "a telephone conversation be-
tween the parties, and upon this subject matter in litigation, having
been testified to -by one of the parties, may also be testified to by a
bystander, so far as he heard it."
'
25
The decision in the instant case seems to be in line with the
general trend of judicial opinion. A presumption of agency is sub-
stantiated by the fact that the party first answering the telephone
called another to take the particular message. For the court not
to consider the practical use of the telephone in the commercial
world and to require further identity of the antiphonal speaker than
a presumptive showing of his agency would be to restrict business
to the rules established before the coming of the telephone.
W. E. ANGLIN.
Evidence-Jury's Deliberations as Privileged.
The defendant, a juror indicted for contempt, was charged with
concealing or misstating facts bearing upon ineligibility during her
voir dire examination. Testimony of other jurors as to what de-
fendant said during the deliberations in the jury room was admitted
as evidence that her answers were false and evasive and that she
was biased and prejudiced at the time of the examination. Held:
' Marton v. United States, 60 Fed. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 7th, 1832).
People v. Albritton, 110 Cal. 188, 294 Pac. 76 (1930).
2Pitt Lumber Co. v. Askew, 185 N. C. 87, 116 S. E. 93 (1923) (where a
bystander was allowed to testify as to what he actually heard but could not
give substantive testimony as to the identity of the one at the other end of
the line).
'Kent v. Cobb, 133 Pac. 424 (Colo. 1913). Cf. Sanders v. Griffin, 191
N. C. 447, 132 S. E. 157 (1926), (where the bystander gave testimony as to
what he heard as original evidence).
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the testimony was properly admitted as corroborative evidence, sup-
plementing and confirming the case that would exist without it.'
The admissibility of the testimony of a juror relating to happen-
ings in the jury room is generally raised on motion to set aside the
verdict and is generally disallowed.2 The writer has found only
one case other than the instant one where such evidence was pro-
posed to show the juror guilty of contempt for false answers on his
voir dire e~camination. In the case of In re NKns 3 the contemnor
was a juror in a trial upon an indictment for keeping a disorderly
house. On the voir dire examination he said that he did not know
the defendants and knew nothing of their place. Evidence of ju-
rors was admitted to prove that he stated in the jury room that he
did know the defendants and that their place was correct and proper.
The commentators who have considered this problem are ap-
parently opposed to the result reached by these two cases. They
seem to conclude, without citing any cases directly to that effect,
that statements made to a fellow-juror are privileged and cannot be
disclosed against the juror's consent.4
'Clark v. United States, 53 Sup. Ct. 465, 77 L. ed. (Advance Opinions)
515 (1933).
"McDonald and U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Pless, 238 U. S. 264,
35 Sup. Ct. 783, 59 L. ed. 1300 (1915) ; Hicks v. U. S. Shipping Board Emer-
gency Fleet Corp., 14 F. (2d) 316 (S. D. N. Y. 1926); Central of Georgia
Ry. Co. v. Holmes, 223 Ala. 188, 134 So. 875 (1931); 'Valentine v. Pollak,
95 Conn. 556, 111 AtI. 869 (1920); Ballance v. Dunnington, 246 Mich. 36,
224 N. W. 434 (1929); Miller v. Gerard, 200 App. Div. 870, 192 N. Y. Supp.
884 (1922); Campbell v. High Point, T. & D. R. Co., 201 N. C. 102, 159
S. E. 327 (1931) ; Teeters v. Frost, 145 Okla. 273, 292 Pac. 356 (1930) ; Eyak
River Packing Co. v. Huglen, 143 Wash. 229, 255 Pac. 123 (1927); Vaise v.
Delaval, 1 T. R. 11, K. B. (1785); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§2354, rn 1 (rule prevails except in possibly six jurisdictions); note (1928)
6 N. C. L. REv. 315. Contra: Composh v. Powers, 75 Mont. 493, 244 Pac.
298 (1926) (statute permits where the verdict was reached by resort to
determination by chance); Jones v. Wichita Valley Ry. Co., 195 S. W.
890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (statute allows testimony but not affidavits);
Owen v. Warburton, 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 326 (1807); ef. Hyman v. Eames, 41
Fed. 676 (C. C. D. Colo. 1890)..
8188 App. Div. 424, 176 N. Y. Supp. 858 (1919) ; cf. In re Cochran, 237
N. Y. 336, 143 N. E. 212, 32 A. L. R. 433 (1924) (where juror stated addi-
tional facts, proposed acquittal if bond were given for defendant's good be-
havior, and, though he believed the defendant guilty, refused to convict, the
court refused to punish him for contempt on the ground that the conduct
was privileged).
"5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2346 ("Under the Parol Evidence
rule, the juror's testimony is excluded only when it is offered to prove facts
nullifying the verdict, on a motion for a new trial. But under the Privileged
Communications rule; the juror's testimony would be excluded for any pur-
pose whatever, . . . for example, where upon another trial he was a witness
and his bias was offered to be shown by his expressions during retirement
with the former jury.") HUGHES, EVIDENCE (1907) 302; 5 JONES, EVIDENCE
(2d ed. 1926) §2212; UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1923) §311.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
While public policy should protect the freedom of debate and
expression of opinion on the merits of the case in order that the
evidence may be thoroughly considered, 5 such policy does not re-
quire the protection of a juror who gives additional evidence as in
the case of In re Nunns.6 Although Mr. Wigmore contends that no
such limitation should be placed upon privileged communications,"
it would seem to be the better rule that statements of personal knowl-
edge, which should be given by the juror as a witness in open court
under oath and upon cross-examination, should not be privileged.
Therefore, it is believed that it would be more desirable to adopt a
middle view, namely, that only certain communications should be
privileged.
In the principal case the Circuit Court of Appeals,8 though ad-
mitting that there was authority contra, was content to say that such
communications should not be privileged. The Supreme Court
did not deny that such a privilege existed or that the communica-
tions were those that should be protected, but held that since the de-
fendant had fraudulently entered into the relation giving rise to the
privilege she was not entitled to the protection of that privilege. It
was thought that the policy of protecting jurors from disclosure of
the course of their deliberations was outweighed by the necessity
of preserving the jury from corrupting influences, and this view
is believed to be sound.
JULE MCMICHAEL.
Negligene--Duty of Guest in Automobile.
Plaintiff was the guest of the defendant in the rear seat of the
latter's automobile. Although the plaintiff was aware that the night
was foggy and the road narrow and winding, she did not protest the
defendant's maintenance of a dangerous rate of speed. Defendant
lost control of the car, which went over an embankment, and the
plaintiff was injured. Held: No recovery; an automobile guest, fail-
ing to protest the driver's action in encountering possible danger,
reasonably apparent to both, is guilty of contributory negligence.'
5 In the case of In re Cochran, supra note 3, 143 N. E. at 213, the court
said: "It is not alone as to the final result-the verdict-that they are pro-
tected. Public policy requires that they be given the uttermost freedom of
debate as it requires in the case of the Legislature."
'Supra note 3.
'WIGMORE, "viDExvFc §2354 (b); ef. In re Cochran, supra note 3.
861 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
'Adams v. Hutchinson, 167 S. E. 135 (W. Va. 1932).
